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THE LIABILITY OF AN UNDISCLOSED
PRINCIPAL.
I.

§ i. Preliminary Considerationsas to Liability. - It is ordinarily
to the interest, as it is usually the duty, of an agent in making contracts for his principal fully to disclose the fact of the agency and
to make the contract in the name and on the account of the principal.
It often happens, however, that the agent will either intentionally or
unintentionally omit to do this. He may (i) disclose that he has a
principal but conceal his name and identity; or he may (2) wholly
conceal the fact that he is an agent and contract as though he were
himself the principal in the transaction. In either of these cases the
agent usually makes himself personally liable upon the contract.
In the second case the liability of the agent is ordinarily clear, because no other person being known in the transaction, the agent is
the one upon whom the liability directly rests. In the first case also
the agent may be liable because, though disclosing the fact that he
has a principal, but concealing his name, he may be held to have
pledged his own responsibility.
Conceding that the agent thus is, or may be, liable upon the contract, the question arises whether the principal, if discovered, may
be held liable upon it also. In favor of such a liability it may be
urged that inasmuch as there is a principal in the transaction who
has authorized the contract to be made and who is entitled to its
benefits, the principal should be held liable upon the contract when
he is discovered. Against such a liability it may be urged that it is
contrary to the general principles of contract to permit a person to
be bound upon a contract who does not appear to be a party to it,
and that in the case where no principal was known to exist the effect
of such a rule is to give to the other party the benefit of a liability
which he did not contemplate at the time of making the contract and
for which he did not stipulate. A right to hold the undisclosed principal in such a case would, as was pointed out by a distinguished
English judge, come to the other party as a mere "God-send."
33
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Whatever may be thought where the contract is informal and
oral, it is certain that where the contract is in writing, and especially
where it contains no intimation of the existence of a principal, a
rational theory for the principal's liability is not easy to discover.
The contract is in the name and over the signature of the agent.
How can that name and signature be treated as the name and signature of the principal? If the agent also could not be held upon it,
it might then be said that the agent's name had, for the time being,
been adopted as the business name of the principal, and was therefore, in this case, the name of the principal. But if the agent is to
be held liable also because it is his name, how can the principal
be held upon the theory that the name used is not the agent's name
but the business name of the principal? May the name be, at the
same time, the actual name of the agent and the trade name of the
principal?
A theory of the legal identification of the principal with the agent
leads to the same result. If the principal and the agent are legally
one and that one the principal, it may not be difficult to see that the
contract is the principal's contract, but it is not easy to see how the
contract is also the contract of the agent.
§ 2. General Ride - Undisclosed Principalliable when discovered.
- Notwithstanding these objections, the considerations making for
the principal's liability have generally prevailed under English
law, though not under the Continental systems, and it is unquestionably the general rule of our law that an undisclosed principal,
when subsequently discovered, may, at the election of the other
party if exercised within a reasonable time, be held liable upon
all simple non-negotiable contracts made in his behalf by his duly
authorized agent, although the contract was originally made with
the agent in entire ignorance of the existence of a principal.'
1 Merrill v. Kenyon, 48 Conn. 3X4; Appeal ofNational Shoe & Leather Bank,
55 Conn. 469; Dashaway Ass'n v. Rogers, 79 Cal. 211; Simpson v. Patapsco Guano
Co., 99 Ga. i68; Baldwin v. Garrett, iii Ga. 876 (but the matter is regulated by the
Code, § 3024); Guest v. Burlington Opera House Co., 74 Ia. 457; Steele-Smith

Grocery Co. v. Potthast, 1o9 Ia. 413; Edwards v. Gildemeister, 61 Kan. i41; Jones
v. Johnson, 86 Ky. 530; Ware v. Long, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 696; Hyde v. Wolf, 4 La.
234; Maxcy Mfg. Co. v. Burnham, 89 Me. 538; Henderson v. Mayhew,

2

Gill (Md.)

393; Mayhew v. Graham, 4 Gill (Md.) 363; Tobin v.Larkin, 183 Mass. 389; Schendell v. Stevenson, 153 Mass. 351; Hunter v. Giddings, 97 Mass. 4i; Exchange Bank
v. Rice, 107 Mass. 37; Byington v. Simpson, 134 Mass. 169; Huntington v. Knox,

7 Cush. (Mass.) 371; Eastern R. R. Co. v. Benedict, 5 Gray (Mass.) 56i; Lerned v.
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The rule applies not only where the principal has in fact received
the benefits of the contract, but also where the contract still remains
executory.'
undoubtThe rule itself is doubtless an anomaly, but even so it is
2
Agency.
of
law
the
in
rule
other
any
edly as well settled as
§ 3. Rule applies to all Simple Contracts.- This general rule im-

posing obligations upon the undisclosed principal when discovered,
extends to all contracts made by oral negotiation under his authority.
It also, by the weight of authority, applies to all simple non-negotiable
contracts in writing, entered into by an agent in his own name and
within the scope of his authority, although the name of the principal
does not appear in the instrument, and was not disclosed, and alJohns, 9 Allen (Mass.) 419; Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Allen, ix6 Mass. 398; Schweyer v. Jones,
152 Mich. 241; Lindeke Land Co. v. Levy, 76 Minn. 364; Simmons Hdw. Co. v.
Todd, 79 Miss. 163; Weber v. Collins, 139 Mo. 5oz; Lamb v. Thompson, 31 Neb.
448; Greenberg v. Palmieri, 71 N. J. L. 83; Elliott v. Bodine, 59 N. J. L. 567; Yates
v. Repetto, 65 N. J. L. 294; Borcherling v. Katz, 37 N. J. Eq. 150; Jennings v. Davies,
2 9 N. Y. App. Div. 227; Taintor v. Prendergast, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 72; Briggs v. Partridge,
64 N. Y. 357; Cobb v. Knapp, 71 N. Y. 348; Inglehart v. Thousand Island Hotel Co.,
7 Hun (N. Y.) 547; Coleman v. First Natl Bank, 53 N. Y. 388; Dykers v. Townsend,
24 N. Y. 6x; Meeker v. Claghorn, 44 N. Y. 349; Jessup v. Steurer, 75 N. Y. 613; Adolff
v. Schmitt, 13 N. Y. Misc. 623; Davis v. Lynch, 31 N. Y. Misc. 724; City Trust Co.
v. Amer. Brew. Co., 174 N. Y. 486; Patrick v. Grand Forks Merc. Co., 13 N. D. 12;
Harper v. Tiffin Nat'l Bank, 54 Ohio St. 425; Smith v. Plummer, 5 Whart. (Penn.) 89;
Hubbert v. Borden, 6 Whart. (Penn.) 91; Rice v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., i Lack.
Leg. News (Penn.) xxi; Episcopal Church v. Wiley, 2 Hill (S. C.) Ch. 584; S. c.
x Riley (S. C.) Ch. 156; Waddill v. Sebree, 88 Va. 1o12; Belt v. Washington WaterPower Co., 24 Wash. 387; Ford v. Williams, 21 Howard (U. S.) 287; Moore v. Sun
Ptg. & Pub. Assn., 41 C. C. A. 5o6; Boland v. Northwestern Fuel Co., 34 Fed. 523;
Higgins vJ. Senior, 8 M. & W. 834; Browning v. Provincial Ins. Co., L. R. 5 P- C.
App. 263; Calder v. Dobell, L. R. 6 C. P. 486; Trueman v. Loder, xi A. & E. 594;
Smethurst v. Mitchell, z E. & E. 622; Thomson v. Davenport, 9 B. & C. 78.
See Tobin v. Larkin, 183 Mass. 389; Lerned v. Johns, 9 Allen (Mass.) 419;
Dykers v. Townsend, 2 4 N. Y. 6x; Hubbert v. Borden, 6 Whart. (Penn.) 91; Waddill
v. Sebree, 88 Va. 1012.
2 Kayton v. Barnett, i16 N. Y. 625.
In an article upon the general subject by Professor Ames in 18 Yale Law journal
443, it is suggested that, instead of attempting to work out a rule under which the
principal can be held directly liable in an action at law, the legal liability should be
held to be where the contract itself puts it, namely, upon the agent, but that then, in
as much as it is the duty of the principal to exonerate the agent from the liabilities
incurred on his account, the other party should be permitted in equity to avail himself of this liability of the principal to the agent, thereby putting the liability ultimately,
where it justly belongs, upon the principal on whose account the contract was made.
Many practical objections to a remedy purely equitable will, however, at once suggest
themselves.
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though the party dealing with the agent supposed that the latter was
acting for himself; ' and this rule obtains as well in respect to contracts which are required to be in writing, as to those to whose validity
a writing is not essential?
§ 4. Parol Evidence to identify the Principal.- For the purpose
of identifying the principal, parol evidence may be admitted. It does
not violate the principle which forbids the contradiction of a written
agreement by parol evidence, nor that which forbids the discharging
of a party by parol from the obligations of his written contract. The
writing is not contradicted, nor is the agent discharged; the result
is, merely, that an additional party is made liable.' As is said by
a learned judge in a Massachusetts case:
"Whatever the original merits of the rule that a party not mentioned
in a simple contract in writing may be charged as a principal upon oral
evidence, even where the writing gives no indication of an intent to
bind any other person than the signer, we cannot reopen it, for it is as
well settled as any part of the law of agency." 4
§ 5. Rule does not apply to Contractsunder Seal. - It was a fundamental principle of the common law that, upon an instrument under
seal, those persons only can be charged who appear upon its face to
I Briggs v. Partridge, 64 N. Y. 357; Dykers v. Townsend, 24 N. Y. 61; Coleman
v. First Nat. Bank, 53 N. Y. 393; Ford v. Williams, 21 How. (. S.) 289; Weber v.
Collins, 139 Mo. 5o1; Waddill v. Sebree, 88 Va. 1o2; Belt v. Washington Power Co.,
24 Wash. 387.
2 Tobin v. Larkin, E83 Mass. 389; Borchering v. Katz, 37 N. J. Eq. i5o; Briggs
v. Partridge, supra. Cf. Bourne v. Campbell, 21 R. I. 490, probably wrong.

'Higgins v. Senior, 8 M. & W. 834; Huntington v. Knox, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 37r;
Ford v. Williams, 21 How. (U. S.) 287; Lindeke Land Co. v. Levy, 76 Minn. 364
(overruling Rowell v. Oleson, 3 2Minn. 288); Belt v. Washington Power Co., 24 Wash.
387. There is language contrary in a number of cases though they are practically all
distinguishable: Ferguson v. McBean, 91 Cal. 63 (a sealed instrument); Gillig v.
Road Co., 2 Nev. 214 (a negotiable instrument). Chandler v. Coe, 54 N. H. 561;
Heffron v. Pollard, 73 Tex. 96; Silver v. Jordan, 136 Mass. 319; Matter of Bateman,
7 N. Y. Misc. 633; Brown v. Tainter, 114 N. Y. App. Div. 446, sometimes referred to,
were cases of a disclosed principal and involved a different question, elsewhere considered. Murphy v. Clarkson, 25 Wash. 585, is contra, but the court apparently overlooked the distinction between ordinary simple contracts in writing and negotiable
instruments, which was involved in Shuey v. Adair, 18 Wash. 188.
4 Holmes, J., in Byington v. Simpson, 134 Mass. 169 [citing Huntington v. Knox,
7 Cush. (Mass.) 371; Eastern R. R. v. Benedict, 5 Gray (Mass.) 561; Lerued v.
Johns, 9 Allen (Mass.) 419; Hunter v. Giddings, 97 Mass. 4i; Exchange Bank v.
Rice, 107 Mass. 37; National Ins. Co. v. Allen, 116 Mass. 398; Higgins v. Senior,

8 M. & W. 8341.
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be the parties to it.' Under this rule an undisclosed principal could
not be charged upon such an instrument.'
I "Where a contract is made by deed, under seal, on technical grounds, no one but
a party to the deed is liable to be sued upon it, and, therefore, if made by an attorney
or agent, it must be made in the name of the principal, in order that he may be a party,
because otherwise he is not bound by it." Shaw, C. J., in Huntington v. Knox, 7 Cush.
(Mass.) 374.
2 Huntington v. Knox, supra; Haley v. Belting Co., 14o Mass. 73; Mahoney v.
McLean, 26 Minn. 415; Briggs v. Partridge, 64 N. Y. 357; Kiersted v. Orange, etc.
R. Co., 69 N. Y. 343; Schaefer v. Henkel, 75 N. Y. 378; Henricus v. Englert, 137
N. Y. 488; Farrar v. Lee, io N. Y. App. Div. x30; Whitehouse v. Drisler, 37 N. Y.
App. Div. 525; Williams v. Magee, 76 N. Y. App. Div. 512; Spencer v. Huntington,
zoo N. Y. App. Div. 463 (aff'd without opinion 183 N. Y. 506); Denike v. De Graaf,
87 Hun, 61 (aff'd, no opinion, 152 N. Y. 65o); Benham v. Emery, 46 Hun r56; Smith
v. Pierce, 6o N. Y. Supp. ioix; Stanton v. Granger, 125 N.Y. App. Div. 174; Willard
v. Wood, 135 U. S. 309, 313; Badger Silver Min. Co. v. Drake, 31 C. C. A. 378; City
of Providence v. Miller, ii R. I. 272.
Briggs v. Partridge, 64 N. Y. 357, is a leading case. In this case it appeared that an
agent appointed by parol had, without disclosing his agency, made in his own name
a contract under seal for the purchase of real estate, but it was held that the contract
was not enforceable against the principal either as a contract under seal or as a simple
contract. Andrews, J., said: "Can a contract under seal, made by an agent in his
own name for the purchase of land, be enforced as the simple contract of the real principal when he shall be discovered? No authority for this broad proposition has been
cited. There are cases which hold that when a sealed contract has been executed in
such form that it is, in law, the contract of the agent and not of the principal, but the
principal's interest in the contract appears upon its face, and he has received the benefit
of performance by the other party, and has ratified and confirmed it by acts in pais,
and the contract is one which would have been valid without a seal, the principal may
be made liable in assumpsit upon the promise contained in the instrument, which may
be resorted to to ascertain the terms of the agreement. . . . The plaintiff's agreement in this case was with Hurlburd (the agent) and not with the defendant. The
plaintiff has recourse against Hurlburd on his covenants, which was the only remedy
which he contemplated when the agreement was made. No ratification of the contract
by the defendant is shown. To change it from a specialty to a simple contract, in order
to charge the defendant, is to make a different contract from the one the parties intended. A seal has lost most of its former significance, but the distinction between
specialties and simple contracts is not obliterated. A seal is still evidence, though not
conclusive, of a consideration. The rule of limitation in respect to the two classes of
obligations is not the same. We find no authority for the proposition that a contract
under seal may be turned into the simple contract of a person not in any way appearing on its face to be a party to, or interested in it, on proof dehors the instrument, that
the nominal party was acting as the agent of another, and especially in the absence of
any proof that the alleged principal has received any benefit from it, or has in any way
ratified it, and we do not feel at liberty to extend the doctrine applied to simple contracts executed by an agent for an unnamed principal, so as to embrace this case."
See also Tuthill v. Wilson, go N. Y. 423. So the rule that an unnamed and unknown
principal shall stand liable for the contract of his agent does not apply to a lease under
seal. The relation between the owner of land and those who occupy it is of a purely
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The common-law incidents attached to the presence of a seal were
confessedly highly technical, and efforts have been made in many
places to abolish them. In several States statutes have been enacted,
though not always in the same form or having the same effect. In
Minnesota, for example, the statute has abolished seals and declared
that the addition of a seal to an instrument shall "not affect its
character in any respect." Under this statute it has been held that
an undisclosed principal may be charged upon an instrument under
seal.1
On the other hand in Texas, where the statute declares that a seal
shall not be necessary to the validity of any contract, etc., and that
the addition of a seal shall not "in any way affect the force and effect
the comof the same," it was held that the statute had not changed
2
principal.
undisclosed
the
to
respect
mon-law rule with
With reference to authority for the execution of in§ 6. struments, a distinction has been made, between instruments to
whose validity a seal is an essential and those to which a seal may
happen to be attached but which would be perfectly valid and effective without it, - it being held in the latter case that the unnecessary
seal might be disregarded as so much surplusage and the instrument
dealt with, so far as authority for its execution is concerned, as though
no seal were attached.
Extending that doctrine still further, it has been suggested that it
may be availed of here,- that is to say, that for the purpose of
charging an undisclosed principal an unnecessary seal may be regarded as non-existent; and a number of cases have adopted the
legal character, and the fact that a lessee takes a lease for an unnamed principal, but
in his own name, will not render the unnamed principal liable for the rent. Borcherling v. Katz, 37 N. J. Eq. i~o. And this is true although the fact of the agency is
recited and it extrinsically appears that the lessee acted as agent, and although the principal occupies the premises without assignment of the lease and furnishes money to
pay the rent. Kiersted v. Orange, etc. R. R. Co., 69 N. Y. 343- See also Haley v.
o
Belting Co., x4 Mass. 73; Schaefer v. Henkel, 75 N. Y. 378; Rand v. Moulton, 72
N. Y. App. Div. 236.
A contract for the sale of land made by the agent under seal in his own name and
not disclosing any principal cannot be specifically enforced against the principal
even though it be alleged that he ratified it. Stanton v. Granger, r25 N. Y. App. Div.
174. No action for damages against the principal will lie in such a case. Mahoney
v. McLean, 26 Minn. 415.
I Streeter v. Janu, 9 Minn. 393. To same effect, Gibbs v. Dickson, 33 Ark.
107,
2 Sanger v. Warren, 91 Tex. 472. See also Jones v. Morris, 61 Ala. 5x8, 524.
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suggestion, at least so far as to permit the undisclosed principal to
sue upon the contract.'
So far as action upon the contract itself is concerned, however,
many other cases, chiefly in New York, have refused to apply this
theory, and have held to the general rule.?
In a few cases contracts dearly intended to be the contract of the
principal, but sealed with the seal of the agent, have been held en3
forceable by and against the principal as simple contracts.
There undoubtedly may also be cases in which, though no action
will lie against the principal upon the contract itself, there may yet
be such elements of adoption or receipt of benefits of a contract
actually authorized by him as to justify a recovery against him upon
an implied promise.4
§ 7. Does not apply to Negotiable Instruments. -

In addition to

the limitation upon the principal's liability growing out of the nature of
the instrument under seal, "there is," as pointed out in a case already
referred to,5 "a well-recognized exception to the rule in the case of
notes and bills of exchange, resting upon the law merchant. Persons
dealing with negotiable instruments are presumed to take them on
the credit of the parties whose names appear upon them; and a
person not a party cannot be charged upon proof that the ostensible
party signed or indorsed as his agent." This doctrine has been applied in many cases.'
It is entirely possible, however, notwithstanding this rule, that an
action may, in many instances, be maintained against the principal,
I Stowell v. Eldred, 39 Wis. 614; Kirschbon v. Bonzel, 67 Wis. 178; Lancaster v.
Knickerbocker Ice Co., 153 Pa. 427; Love v. Sierra Nevada, etc. Co., 32 Cal.
639.
2 Briggs v. Partridge, 64 N. Y. 357; Kiersted v. Orange, etc. R. Co., 69 N. Y.
343; Schaefer v. Henkel, 75 N. Y. 378; Henricus v. Englert, 137 N. Y. 488; Spencer
v. Huntington, ioo N. Y. App. Div. 463; Denike v. De Graaf, 87 Hun (N. Y.) 61;
Smith v. Pierce, 6o N. Y. Supp. ioi;
Stanton v. Granger, 125 N. Y. App. Div. 174,
and other New York cases cited supra.
3 Randall v. Van Vechten, i
Johns. (N. Y.) 6o; Dubois v. Delaware & Hud.
Canal Co., 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 285.
4 Moore v. Granby Mining Co., 8o Mo. 86.
Briggs v. Partridge, 64 N. Y. 357.
0 Heaton v. Myers, 4 Colo. 59; Sparks v. Dispatch Transfer Co., 104 Mo. 531;
Webster v. Wray, x9 Neb. 558; Cortland Wagon Co. v. Lynch, 82 Hun (N. Y.) 173;
Ranger v. Thalmann, 84 N. Y. App. Div. 341; affirmed on opinion below, 178
N. Y. 574; Andenton v. Shoup, 17 Ohio St. 126; Shuey v. Adair, i8 Wash. i88;
Cragin v. Lovell, io 9 U. S. 194; Ducarrey v. Gill, Mood. & Mal. 450.
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not upon the note itself, but upon the consideration for which it was
given.1
§ 8. Exceptions to the General Rule. - The general rule, moreover,
is subject to certain exceptions. Of these the most direct and immediate are two. One of them grows out of the question whether the
other party should be permitted to recover of the principal if the
latter has already paid, credited, or settled with the agent. The
other, whether such a recovery should be allowed if the other party
has already taken steps indicating that he intends to charge the
agent.
For the purpose of discussion, these two exceptions may be
tentatively stated as follows:
i. Where Principal has settled with Agent. - That the principal
is not liable where, before the other party has intervened with his
claim, the principal has settled with, paid, or credited the agent in
good faith, and in reliance upon such a state of conduct or representations on the part of the other party as to reasonably lead the principal to infer that the agent had already settled with such other party,
or that the latter looks exclusively to the agent for payment.
2. Where other Party has "elected to hold Agent only.That the
principal cannot be held liable where the other party, with full knowledge as to who was the principal, and with the power of choosing
between him and the agent, has distinctly and unquestionably elected
to treat the agent alone as the party liable.
§ 9. Of the First Exception -

Change in Accounts -

Misleading

Conduct.- This subject has been much discussed in the English
courts and various and conflicting rules have been laid down in
successive cases. Some of these rules have been adopted by the
courts and text-writers in this country, but have been afterwards denied or limited by later cases in the English courts, and the result
has been an exceedingly unsatisfactory condition of the law.
§ io. Thomson v. Davenport.- One of the earliest of these
cases is that of Thomson v. Davenport,2 decided in the Court of
King's Bench in 1829. In that case the agent disclosed that he was
acting for a principal in Scotland but did not disclose his principal's
name. Lord Tenterden, in his opinion, said:
"I take it to be a general rule, that if a person sells goods (supposing at
the time of the contract he is dealing with a principal), but afterwards
I Coaling Co. v. Howard, 13o Ga. 807.

2 9

Barn. & Cress. 78 .
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discovers that the person with whom he has been dealing is not the principal in the transaction, but agent for a third person, though he may in the
meantime have debited the agent with it, he may afterwards recover the
amount from the real principal; subject, however, to this qualification,
that the state of the account between the principal and the agent is not
altered to the prejudice of the principal ";
and Bayley, J., in the same case, said:
"Where a purchase is made by an agent, the agent does not, of necessity,
so contract as to make himself personally liable; but he may do so. If he
does make himself personally liable, it does not follow that the principal
may not be liable also, subject to this qualification, that the principal shall
not be prejudiced by being made personally liable if the justice of the case
is that he should not be personally liable. If the principal has paid the
agent, or if the state of accounts between the agent and the principal would
make it unjust that the seller should call on the principal, the fact of payment or such a state of accounts would be an answer to the action brought
by the seller where he had looked to the responsibility of the agent."
The rule as laid down by Lord Tenterden was approved by Mr.
Parsons in his work on Contracts,' and by Judge Story in his work
on Agency.2 It was also adopted in Indiana.'
this case came Heald
§ ii. Heald v. Kenwortlsy. -Following
4
v. Kenworthy, decided in the Exchequer in 1855. The case arose
upon the sufficiency of a plea to a declaration for goods sold and
delivered. The plea alleged that the goods were bought for defendant by his agent; that the latter bought in his own name and not in
that of defendant; that plaintiff gave credit to the agent not knowing of defendant; and that while plaintiff still gave credit to the agent
defendant, in good faith, "at reasonable and proper times and according to the usual course of dealing" between himself and his
agent, settled with the agent, believing and having reason to believe
that the latter would settle with the plaintiff.
The plea was held not to be good. The expressions of Lord
Tenterden and Bayley, J., were shown to be mere dicta, and were
held to be inaccurate statements of the law. Parke, B., who delivered the leading opinion, limited the rule to those cases in which
the principal has been misled by the action of the seller, saying:

Iiz

Parsons on Contracts, 63.
2 Thomas v. Atkinson, 38 Ind. 248.

2Story

on Agency, § 449.

4 io Exch. 739.
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"If the conduct of the seller would make it unjust for him to call upon
the buyer for the money, as, for example, where the principal is induced
by the conduct of the seller to pay his agent the money on the faith that
the agent and seller have come to a settlement on the matter, or if any
representation to that effect is made by the seller, either by words or conduct, the seller cannot afterwards throw off the mask and sue the principal."
Armstrong v. Stokes. - Afterwards arose the case of Armstrong v. Stokes,' decided in the Court of Queen's Bench in 1872.
In this case J. & 0. Ryder, who were commission merchants at Manchester, acting sometimes for themselves and sometimes as agents,
having received an order for goods from defendants, bought them of
plaintiff, without disclosing that they were not acting for themselves.
J. & 0. Ryder delivered the goods to defendants, who paid for
them in good faith. Afterward J. & 0. Ryder failed, not having
paid the plaintiff. Later it was discovered by plaintiff that J. & 0.
Ryder had bought the goods for the defendants, and thereupon the
plaintiff brought the action to charge defendants as undisclosed
principals, but it was held that defendants' payment to J. & 0.
Ryder was a bar to recovery. Blackburn, J., who delivered the
opinion of the court (Blackburn, Mellor, and Lush), held that the
rule laid down by Parke, B., was too narrow, and cited and approved
that advanced by Lord Tenterden and Mr. Justice Bayley.
Referring to the rule of Parke, B., the court say:
§ 12.

"We think that if the rigid rule thus laid down were to be applied to
those who were only discovered to be principals after they had fairly paid
the price to those whom the vendor believed to be the principals, and to
whom alone the vendor gave credit, it would produce intolerable hardship. It may be said, perhaps truly, this is the consequence of that which
might originally have been a mistake, in allowing the vendor to have recourse at all against one to whom he never gave credit, and that we ought
not to establish an illogical exception in order to cure a fault in a rule.
But we find an exception (more or less extensively expressed) always mentioned in the very cases that lay down the rule; and without deciding anything as to the case of a broker, who avowedly acts for a principal (though
not necessarily named), and confining ourselves to the present case, which
is one in which, to borrow Lord Tenterden's phrase in Thomson v. Davenport,2 the plaintiff sold the goods to J. & 0. Ryder (the agents), 'supposing at the time of the contract he was dealing with a principal,' we think
I L. R. 7 Q- B. 598, 3 Eng. (Moak) 2.17.

2Supra.
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such an exception is established. We wish to be understood as expressing
no opinion as to what would have been the effect of the state of the accounts
between the parties if J. & 0. Ryder had been indebted to the defendants
on a separate account, so as to give rise to a set-off or mutual credit between
them. We confine our decision to the case where the defendants, after
the contract was made, and in consequence of it, bond fide and without
moral blame, paid J. & 0. Ryder at a time when the plaintiff still gave
credit to J. & 0. Ryder and knew of no one else. We think that after
that it was too late for the plaintiff to come upon the defendant."
§ 13. Irvine v. Watson - In the Queen's Bench. - This case, in
its turn, was followed by Irvine v. Watson,' decided in the Queen's
Bench in 1879, in which Bowen, J., laid down the following rules:
"There are two classes of sales through an agent to an undisclosed
principal which it is necessary to distinguish. i. Where the seller supposes himself to be dealing with a principal, but discovers afterwards that
he has been selling to an agent, and that there is an undisclosed principal
behind, the law allows the seller to have recourse on such discovery to the
undisclosed principal, provided always 2 that the principal has not meanwhile paid the agent, or that the state of accounts between the principal
and agent does not render it unjust, i. e., inequitable that the seller should
any longer look to the principal for payment. This statement of the proviso which relieves the undisclosed principal in certain cases from all
necessity to pay the seller was thought by Parke, B., and the other judges
in Heald v. Kenworthy 3 to be too large without further explanation, and
they expressed the view that the only case in which the seller under such
circumstances was precluded from having recourse to the undisclosed
principal when discovered, was when the seller, by some conduct of his
own, had misled the principal into paying or settling with his agent in the
interim. The principal, such is the reasoning of the Court of Exchequer,
has originally authorized his agent to create a debt, and the principal
cannot be discharged from the debt unless the seller has estopped himself,
by his conduct, from enforcing it against him. The Court of Queen's
Bench in Armstrong v. Stokes 4 do not adopt this narrower version of
Lord Tenterden's and Mir. Justice Bayley's proviso. They revert to the
wider language used by Lord Tenterden and Bayley, J., in Thomson v.
Davenport, 5 and it must now be taken to be the law that a seller who has
given credit to an agent, believing him to be a principal, cannot have re1 5 Q. B. Div.

102, 29 Eng. Rep. (Mfoak) 186.
2 See per Lord Tenterden, C. J., and Bayley, J., in Thomson v. Davenport, 9 B.
& C. 78.
zio Exch. 745.
4 Supra.
'Supra.
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course against the undisclosed principal, if the principal has bond fide paid
the agent at a time when the seller still gave credit to the agent, and knew
of no one else except him as principal.
"2. The present case is one that belongs to a distinct but analogous
class. At the time of the dealing in the goods, the seller was informed that
the person who came to buy was buying for a principal, but was not told,
and did not ask, who that principal was, nor anything further about him.
Thomson v. Davenport I is the leading authority to show that, in such a
case, where no payment or settlement in account between the undisclosed
principal and his agent has intervened, the seller may afterwards have
recourse to the undisclosed principal. But what if the undisclosed principal has meanwhile innocently paid or settled with his agent? If indeed
such payment or settlement is the result of any misleading conduct on the
part of the seller, then, no doubt, the general principle alluded to in Heald
v. Kenworthy 2 would equally apply, and the seller could no longer pursue
his remedy against the man whom he had misled. But is this the only
proviso, or must a wider proviso still in the present class of cases be engrafted on the statement of the rule, similar to the proviso as finally sanctioned in Armstrong v. Stokes.3 This was a case in which, at the time of
sale, exclusive credit had been given by the seller to the agent, who bought
in his own name as principal. In the present instance the agent bought,
it is true, in his own name, but held out to the seller the additional advantage of the credit of an unnamed principal behind. What difference
to the liability of the principal does this make? It is obvious that when,
as in Armstrong v. Stokes, 4 the seller deals exclusively with the agent as
principal, the seller sells knowing, if his buyer turns out to have a principal behind him, the principal will have, at all events, been justified in
assuming, as the fact is, that the seller deals simply with the agent. The
principal may be expected to arrange with his agent on this basis. If before recourse is had to him, the undisclosed principal has put his agent
in funds to pay, the seller cannot afterward object that the undisclosed
principal, who had a right to suppose his credit was not looked to in the
matter, should have held his hand. The case is altered where the agent,
when buying, states he has a principal whose existence, though he does
not name him, he is authorized in mentioning. I think that the liability
of the principal, who under such circumstances pays his agent, to pay over
again to the seller must depend in each case on what passes between the
seller and the agent, acting within the scope of his authority, and on the
precise nature of the contract which the agent has lawfully made ....
The essence of such a transaction is that the seller, as an ultimate resource,
Supra.

I Supra.

2

3 Supra.

'Supra.
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looks to the credit of some one to pay him if the agent does not. Till the
agent fails in payment, the seller does not want to have recourse to this
additional credit. It remains in the background; but if, before the time
comes for payment, or before, on non-payment by the agent, recourse can
be fairly had to the principal whose credit still remains pledged, the principal can pay or settle his account with his own agent, he will be depriving
the seller behind the seller's back of his credit. It surely must, at all events,
be the law that in the case of sales of goods to a broker the principal, known
or unknown, cannot, by paying or settling before the time of payment
comes, with his own agent, relieve himself from responsibility to the seller,
except in the one case where exclusive credit was given by the seller to
the agent. But may the payment or settlement to or with the agent be
safely made in such a case after the day of payment has arrived, and if so
within what time? It seems to me that it can only safely be made if a delay has intervened which may reasonably lead the principal to infer that
the seller no longer requires to look to the principal's credit, - such a delay,
for example, as leads to the inference that the debt is paid by the agent, or
to the inference that, though the debt is not paid, the seller elects to abandon
his recourse to the principal and to look to the agent alone."
§ i4. Irvine v. Watson in the Court of Appeal. - Irvine v. Watson,
1
however, went to the Court of Appeal, where, while the result reached
below-was affirmed, the court declare the rule as laid down by Parke,
B.,-in Heald v. Kenworthy, to be the true one.
The court did not expressly overrule Armstrong v. Stokes [Brainwell, L. f., spoke of it as "a very remarkable case"; and Brett, L. J.,
declared it depended upon "the peculiar customs obtaining in Manchester in relation to the business of commission merchants"], as
the difference in the facts enabled them to draw a distinction between
the cases, but Bramwell, L. J., said:
"It is to my mind certainly difficult to understand that distinction, or
to see how the mere fact of the vendor's knowing or not knowing that the
agent has a principal behind him can affect the liability of that principal.
I should certainly have thought that his liability would depend upon what
he himself knew, that is to say, whether he knew that the vendor had a
claim against him and would look to him for payment in the agent's
default ";
and Brett, L. J., said:
1 5 Q. B. Div. 414.

The opinions differ more or less as reported in these various

reports. The quotations in the text are made from the official edition.
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"If the case of Armstrong v. Stokes arises again, we reserve to ourselves
sitting here, the right of reconsidering it."
The distinction of Parke, B., was again approved in Davison v.
Donaldson,' decided in the Court of Appeal in 1882.
The result, therefore, of the English cases seems to be to limit the
exception to that first stated by Parke, B.
§ 15. What is Misleading Conduct.-

The question of what acts

or conduct of the other party may be sufficient to reasonably lead
the principal to believe that the agent only is relied upon, has not
been much considered, and it is not one which readily lends itself
to definite rules. It must be largely a question of fact in each particular case. In Irvine v. Watson 2 the defendants had given their
broker an order to buy goods and the broker had bought them in
his own name of the plaintiffs, stating that he had a principal but not
disclosing his identity. The invoice given by plaintiffs to the broker
stated that the terms were, "Cash (or before delivery if required)
allowing 2 per cent discount." The broker rendered to defendants
a statement of the purchase stating terms of payment, "Cash, less
2 per cent." The sellers however did not insist upon cash on or
before delivery. They made no demand on the broker for payment
for five or six days. Then they demanded payment from him at
intervals for about ten days, after which, the broker having stopped
payment, they made demand for the first time upon defendants. In
the meantime defendants had paid the broker. Under these circumstances defendants urged that they had a right to believe from the
fact that the terms were "cash," that plaintiffs would not have delivered the goods unless they had gotten their pay, and that therefore
defendants were justified in paying the broker within the rule of
Heald v. Kenworthy. It appeared, however, that even where the
L. R. 9 Q. B. Div. 623.
2 Irvine v. Watson, 5 Q. B. Div. 414.

In Kymer v. Suwercropp, i Camp. io9, it was said that permitting the time of payment to pass 'without a demand upon the principal was a misleading circumstance;
but no such point was actually involved in the case. See Smyth v. Anderson, 7 C. B.
21. Cf. Macfarlane v. Giannacopulo, 3 H. & N. 86o. See this point in Armstrong v.
Stokes, supra; also the argument in Heald v. Kenworthy, io Exch. 739.
In Horsfall v. Fauntleroy, io B. & C. 755, a statement in a sales catalogue that
the terms of credit on which the agent bought were bill at two months was held sufficient to lead the principal to believe that the agent must have given his bill for the
goods and to protect him in thereupon accepting the agent's draft.
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terms of sale were "cash," there was no fixed custom of insisting
upon payment at the precise time of delivery, and that it was not infrequent to allow a few days of grace after delivery. It also appeared
that defendants had paid the broker (by accepting his draft which
he immediately discounted) before part of the goods had in fact
been delivered. It was held that these facts furnished no sufficient
evidence that defendants had been misled by the plaintiffs. Brainwell, L. J., said:
"The terms of the contract were 'cash on or before delivery,' and it is
said that the defendants had a right to suppose that the sellers would not
deliver unless they received payment of the price at the time of delivery. I
do not think, however, that this is a correct view of the case. The plaintiffs
had a perfect right to part with the oil to the broker without insisting
strictly upon their right to prepayment, and there is, in my opinion, nothing in the facts to justify the defendants in believing that they would so
insist. No doubt if there was an invariable custom in the trade to insist
on prepayment where the terms of the contract entitled the seller to it,
that might alter the matter;-and in such case non-insistence on prepayment
might, discharge the buyer if he paid the broker on the faith of the seller
already having been paid. But that is not the case here: the evidence
shows that there is no invariable custom to that effect."
In Davison v. Donaldson I one of several owners of a boat bought
supplies for her of the plaintiffs. The latter knew that there were
other owners, though it does not appear that he knew who they were.
The goods were charged to the one who bought them. He collected
the amount from the other co-owners but did not pay the plaintiff.
The plaintiff finally sued the other owners. Their defense was that
they had settled with the managing owner believing that he had paid
the plaintiff, and that they had been misled by the fact that the plaintiff had not pressed his claim against the purchaser who had now
become insolvent. It did not appear, however, that there had been
any unreasonable delay at the time they settled with the managing
owner, and the real gist of the defendants' contention was that if
they had known of plaintiffs' claim against them they could have
recovered the money from the managing owner before he became
insolvent. This was held not sufficient to release defendants.
Jessel, M. R., said:
I Davison v. Donaldson, 9 Q. B. Div. 623.

See also The Huntsman [x894],

p. 214.
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"The principal cannot be heard to say that the subsequent conduct of
the plaintiff induced him not to sue the agent for repayment of the money.
Independently of the settlement of accounts there is no evidence that the
mere abstaining from pressing the agent is an injury to the principal. A
debtor must find out his creditor and go and pay him. . . No doubt in
many cases principals may reasonably rely on the honor of their agents,
and may not require vouchers; but when they come into a court of law
and seek to excuse themselves from liability, and it turns out that they
have not required the production of vouchers, they must expect the court
to deal strictly with them."
Bowen, L. J., said:
"I do not say that in very special circumstances mere delay may not
amount to misrepresentation: it may be conduct misleading the defendant. But that can only be when there is something in the original contract
or in the conduct of the parties which renders the delay misleading. The
creditor is not obliged to apply to all his debtors if he can get payment
from one of them."
This case, however, as was pointed out by the judges, was not the
mere case of principal and agent because the defendants were coowners or partners with the managing owner and jointly liable with
him.
Giving the agent a receipt for the price, even though mistakenly,
upon the strength of which the principal in good faith pays or credits
the agent, will be such conduct as protects the principal.'
It must be kept in mind that this exception differs
§ 16. from the one to be discussed in a subsequent article. This is not
a question of election but of misleading. It is essential here that the
principal shall have done something -shall have paid or credited
or otherwise altered his situation- which will prejudice him if he
now be called upon to pay. No such act is necessary where election
alone is involved.
It is also possible that that which would not suffice to constitute
an election may be sufficient to relieve the principal under this rule
if he has reasonably acted upon it to his prejudice. For example,
the commencement of suit against the agent is, as will be seen, not
usually regarded as sufficient to constitute an election. But would
the principal be liable again if, after the other party who knows
1 Cheever v. Smith, 15 Johns. (N, Y.) 276; English v. Rauchfuss,
494; Brown v. Telegraph Co., 30 Md. 39; Hyde v. Wolf, 4 La. 234.

21

N. Y. Misc.
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there is a principal has sued the agent, the principal in reliance
thereon should pay the agent?
§ 17. The Rule in the United States. - The subject has not very
frequently arisen in the United States, and has not been thoroughly
considered in any very recent case by a court of last resort. In the
earlier cases, as was naturally to be expected, the tendency was to
follow the rule laid down by Judge Story and Professor Parsons,
based upon the dictum of Lord Tenterden.'
A general statement
of the rule was made some years ago by the New York Court of
Appeals 2 with the exception, "provided he has not in the meantime
in good faith paid the agent"; but the statement was a mere dictum.
Most of the cases which have arisen since Irvine v. Watson was decided by the Court of Appeal have either ignored that decision or
3
apparently failed to note its full significance.
§ x8. General Conclusions. - Notwithstanding the remarks of
Bramwell, L. J., the distinction between the case where the other
party knows that there is a principal in existence though he does not
1 Thus, for example, in 1847, in Clealand v. Walker, i Ala. xo58; in 1855 , in Fish

v. Wood, 4 E. D. Smith (N. Y. Com. Pleas), 327; in X871, in Thomas v. Atkinson,
38 Ind. 248; in x879, in McCullough v. Thompson, 45 N. Y. Super. 449. See also
Ketchum v. Verdell, 42 Ga. 534; Emerson v. Patch, 123 Mass. 541. The Georgia
code enacts substantially the rule of Thomson v. Davenport.
On the contrary, in i866, in York County Bank v. Stein, 24 Md. 447, the rule of
Baron Parke in Heald v. Kenworthy was approved in reliance upon the statement of
the editor of Story on Agency.
3 Knapp v. Simon (1884), 96 N. Y. 284.
3 The question was quite fully considered in x885 in Laing v. Butler, 37 Hun
(N. Y.) 144. The court cites Armstrong v. Stokes and Irvine v. Watson as applying
to different classes of cases, and apparently without attaching much importance to the
comments made upon the former case by the Court of Appeal when Irvine v. Watson
was before it.
There is also a very interesting discussion in Fradley v. Hyland (i888), 37 Fed.
49; Irvine v. Watson, in the Queen's Bench Division, is cited, but not the case in the
Court of Appeal.
A very general reference to the matter is made in Berry v. Chase, 146 Fed. 625.
See the cases reviewed (in x889) by Mr. John W. Beaumont in 23 American Law
Review 565.
The question was involved in Nicholson v. Pease, 61 Vt. 534, and the syllabus indicates the case as holding that "a traveling salesman who is furnished with money by
his employer to pay his expenses while on the road, cannot bind his principal for the
payment of such expenses if, before receiving notice from the party extending such
credit, the employer has settled with his salesman and allowed him the amount of such
expenses." There is, however, no discussion of this point in the opinion.
There is a statement of the ,English rule as a dictum in Simmons Hardware Co. v.
Todd, 79 Miss. 163, and Guest v. Burlington Opera House Co., 74 Iowa 457.
34
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know who he is, and that where he is totally ignorant of the existence
of such a person, seems not without significance. Certainly if the
other party is to be charged with the consequences of his misleading
conduct, it seems much more reasonable and just to do so where he
knows that there is a principal whose actions may be affected by his
conduct than where he has no such knowledge. It may be suggested
that every person who deals without expressly excluding that possibility may always be regarded as potentially an agent with an undisclosed principal; but the suggestion seems forced, if not fanciful.
Nevertheless, the rule of Parke, B., seems on the whole to be reasonable and just. If a principal sends an agent to buy goods for him
and on his account, it is not unreasonable that he should see that
they are paid for. Although the seller may consider the agent to be
the principal, the actual principal knows better. He can easily protect himself by insisting upon evidence that the goods have been paid
for, or that the seller, with full knowledge of the facts, has elected to
rely upon the responsibility of the agent; and if he does not, but, except where misled by some action of the seller, voluntarily pays the
agent without knowing that he has paid the seller, there is no hardship in requiring him to pay again. If the other party has the right,
within a reasonable time, to charge the undisclosed principal upon
his discovery, - and this right seems to be abundantly settled in the
law of agency, - it is difficult to see how this right of the other party
can be defeated, while he is not himself in fault, by dealings between
the principal and the agent, of which he had no knowledge, and to
which he was not a party.
Floyd R. Mechem.
THE UNMVESITY OF CHICAGO.

[To be concluded.]
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